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Using concepts from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), we examined
whether racial/ethnic majority group members’ reactions to future demographic shifts
is a function of the degree to which they perceive their ingroup’s higher-status in society
to be legitimate. In two studies, participants who varied in the degree to which they
perceived their group’s status to be legitimate were either exposed to real projections
for 2060 (i.e., large decline in proportion of population that is the “majority” group), or
fake projections for 2060—that resembled current figures (i.e., small decline). In Study
1, White Americans who perceived their status to be highly legitimate expressed greater
intergroup threat, and negative feelings (anger and fear) toward minorities after exposure
to projections with a large decline in the relative size of the White American population. In
contrast, demographic shift condition had no effect on intergroup threat and negative
feelings toward minorities among White Americans who perceived their status to be
relatively illegitimate; negative feelings and threat remained low across both conditions.
Similarly, in Study 2, ethnic Portuguese people in Portugal exposed to projections in
which there was a large decline in the relative size of the ethnic Portuguese population
experienced more intergroup threat and expressed a greater desire to engage in
anti-immigration behaviors. The effect of demographic shift condition on intergroup threat
and anti-immigration behaviors was stronger among ethnic Portuguese who perceived
their status to be legitimate compared to ethnic Portuguese people who perceived their
status to be relatively illegitimate. These results highlight that across different cultural
contexts, majority group members’ beliefs about the legitimacy of intergroup relations
can affect their reactions to the prospect of increased diversity.
Keywords: demographic shifts, perceived legitimacy of status, majority, minority, United States, Portugal

INTRODUCTION
Many Western countries are projected to be considerably more racially/ethnically diverse by
the middle of the twenty-first century (Browne, 2000). In the United States and Canada racial
minorities already comprise a larger share of the population than Whites in dozens of major
cities (e.g., Vancouver and New York). These cities have been dubbed majority-minority areas—or
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members’ attitudes and emotional responses. What remains
unclear is the psychological and cultural boundary conditions
of these negative reactions to future demographic shifts. It is
unlikely that all majority group members respond negatively
to these anticipated changes. Particular psychological factors
might increase or decrease the likelihood of people responding
negatively. For example, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner,
1979) postulates that members of dominant groups who perceive
their ingroup’s current higher-status position in society as
legitimate, should be more prone to react negatively toward
lower-status outgroups in response to societal conditions that
signal the loss of dominance. As such, one might expect majority
group members who perceive their status as legitimate to be
more threatened by diversity and to respond more negatively
toward minorities, compared to majority group members who
perceive their status to be illegitimate. Furthermore, studies on
majority group members’ responses to anticipated demographic
changes have been limited to Canada and the U.S., even though
other western nations are expected to become more diverse in
the coming decades. Thus, it is unclear whether the findings
obtained in North America generalize to other cultural contexts.
In an attempt to address these issues, we conducted a study
in the U.S. and another in Portugal, to examine if perceived
legitimacy of status moderates majority group members’ negative
psychological responses to future demographic shifts.

places where the racial/ethnic majority comprise less than half
the population (Frey, 2011; Jedwab, 2016). Western Europe is
also becoming more diverse, albeit more slowly (Browne, 2000).
London, England is one of the few major European cities that
has been designated a majority–minority area. White people of
British descent now comprise <50% of the city’s population
(BBC, 2012). Over the last decade or so, the looming declines
in the relative size of racial/ethnic majority groups in western
nations have started to garner media attention. Some social
and political commentators in the media have speculated about
what future demographic shifts might mean for intergroup
relations. Some commentators have suggested that there will
be increased resentment among majority group members (see
Browne, 2000); others argue that majority group members have
been “surprisingly chill” with demographic changes thus far and
that this bodes well for managing increased diversity in the
future (Wilkinson, 2015). Only recently have social scientists
started examining how peoples’ knowledge of these future
changes can affect current intergroup relations. Specifically,
social psychologists have begun to experimentally test how being
made aware of these impending racial/ethnic demographic shifts
affect majority group members’ current feelings and attitudes
(e.g., Outten et al., 2012; Major et al., 2016).
Recent studies conducted in North America have found that
reminding White people of impending demographic shifts can
cause them to experience heightened threat and prejudiced
feelings toward minorities (e.g., Outten et al., 2012; Craig and
Richeson, 2014). For example, Outten et al. (2012, Study 2)
exposed White Canadians to either real demographic projections
for the city of Vancouver in 2058, where Whites are expected
to make up roughly 27% of the population, or fake future
projections—which were similar to demographic figures from
2008, in that Whites still made up slightly more than 50%
of the population. Afterwards participants completed measures
of anger and fear toward minorities and intergroup threat—
or appraisals of the degree to which diversity posed a threat
to White Canadians. The researchers found that compared to
White Canadians exposed to projections in which they were
still a numerical majority, participants who viewed projections
where White Canadians were a numerical minority expressed
more anger and fear toward racial minorities, and greater
intergroup threat. In the U.S., reminding White Americans about
future declines in their relative group size is associated with
greater anti-immigrant attitudes (Major et al., 2016) and greater
explicit and implicit prejudice toward racial minorities (Craig
and Richeson, 2014). These negative psychological reactions
suggest that majority group members use relative group size to
make inferences about their group’s standing in society. Thus,
perceived future decreases in relative group size can constitute
an identity threat to majority group members, as they can signal
a potential loss of relative dominance or status over racial/ethnic
minorities. In turn, the perceived instability of status conveyed
by demographic shifts can lead majority group members to
feel threatened and express prejudice toward minorities (Outten
et al., 2012; Craig and Richeson, 2014).
In sum, recent studies conducted in North America suggest
that reminders of demographic shifts can affect majority group
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FUTURE DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND
THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY
OF STATUS
According to SIT (Tajfel and Turner 1979), belonging to a
high-status group contributes to a positive social identity and
as such people might be motivated to protect their dominant
position. The security of an existing status hierarchy—in terms
of its stability and legitimacy—are key determinants of whether
members of high-status groups feel threatened, and in turn
protect their group by reacting negatively to lower-status
outgroups. Stability refers to the degree to which an existing
social hierarchy appears to be changeable or unchangeable. For
members of high-status groups, intergroup events like shifting
racial/ethnic demographics that signal that their relative social
standing is unstable, can be threatening and foster negative
feelings toward lower-status outgroups (e.g., Outten et al., 2012;
also see Caricati and Sollami, 2017).
Legitimacy refers to the extent that one’s higher-status is fair or
unfair. According to SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), when status
differences are perceived as unfair or illegitimate, members of
high-status groups are less likely to feel threatened by lowerstatus outgroups or behave negatively toward them. Conversely,
when members of high-status groups perceive their status as
legitimate they become more sensitive to threats to it and are
more likely to react negatively to lower-status groups (e.g.,
LeBlanc et al., 2015). Thus, negative reactions to an unstable
future can be exacerbated by perceptions that their ingroup’s
current status is legitimate. In other words, perceptions of
instability and legitimacy can interact such that perceiving that
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by the year 2060 (Colby and Ortman, 2015). Thus, prior findings
could be interpreted as something unique to North America.
To better understand the cultural boundary conditions of how
demographic shifts affect majority group members, we conducted
research with ethnic Portuguese people in Portugal as well as with
White Americans in the U.S.
We selected Portugal as the comparison country because
when testing the universality of a psychological process—
in our case whether majority group members’ negative
reactions to future demographic shifts are dependent on the
perceived legitimacy of their ingroup’s status—it is important
to select cultures that differ on some cultural dimensions (see
Heine, 2016 for recommendations for conducting cross-cultural
research). Indeed, previous cross-cultural studies have found
that Americans and Portuguese people differ markedly in their
endorsement of several cultural values (e.g., Basabe and Ros,
2005; Yeganeh and May, 2011). For instance, Americans typically
hold stronger individualistic values than Portuguese people. That
is, Americans tend to prioritize the individual self, personal
independence, and achievements more so than Portuguese
people. The Portuguese tend to be more collectivistic, in that
they are more likely to give precedence to fulfilling obligations
to close others and maintaining social harmony. Additionally,
Portuguese people generally score higher on values consistent
with a commitment to egalitarianism like social justice and
equality, compared to people from other nations, including the
U.S. (Basabe and Ros, 2005; Schwartz, 2006; Yeganeh and May,
2011).
A cultural difference that is more directly relevant to the
current investigation, however, is the fact that Portugal and the
U.S. have very different immigration histories. Unlike the U.S.,
mass immigration to Portugal is a relatively new phenomenon.
It was not until after the fall of the dictatorial regime and the
independence of the former African colonies in the mid-1970’s
that Portugal began to experience significant immigration flows.
Much of the early immigration flows consisted of Portuguese
returnees and African laborers from former colonies like Cape
Verde and Angola. In 1980, ethnic Portuguese people accounted
for 99.5% of the total population of the country. Today, roughly
90% are ethnic Portuguese (see Peixoto and Sabino, 2009 for
a review Portugal’s immigration history). However, by 2060
ethnic Portuguese people are projected to make-up 70% of the
population (European Commission, 2011). Thus, while Portugal
is not expected to reach a “tipping point” within the next 40–
50 years, Portugal has become much more diverse in a relatively
short period of time, which could represent an identity threat
for ethnic Portuguese people, and foster negative feelings toward
diversity and hostility toward minorities.

one’s legitimate higher-status is unstable can be particularly
threatening. Indeed, studies have found that when members
of higher-status groups perceive their dominant position as
unstable and legitimate, they experience heightened threat about
their group’s standing and react to lower-status groups with
more intense prejudice (e.g., Turner and Brown, 1978; also see
LeBlanc et al., 2015). For example, Verkuyten and Reijerse (2008)
found a significant interaction between perceived legitimacy
and instability on feelings toward minority outgroups in the
Netherlands among ethnic Dutch participants. Specifically, the
more that ethnic Dutch people saw ethnic relations in the
Netherlands as both legitimate and unstable, the more negatively
they felt about ethnic minorities. Thus, if we apply SIT (Tajfel
and Turner, 1979) to the phenomenon of future demographic
shifts (i.e., greater instability), it is reasonable to postulate that
majority group members who perceive that their ingroup’s status
is highly legitimate will respond very negatively to anticipated
demographic changes. Conversely, those who can recognize that
their ingroup’s status is illegitimate to some degree are likely to
be less perturbed by future demographic shifts.
Our predictions also resonate with other theoretical
perspectives, such as social dominance theory (SDT; Sidanius
and Pratto, 1999) and system-justification theory (SJT; Jost et al.,
2004), as a major focus of both perspectives is how legitimizing
beliefs and ideologies shape responses to group-based inequality.
Like social identity theory research, research on SDT and
SJT have accumulated a wealth of evidence that legitimacy
perceptions moderate responses to intergroup contexts. Where
the perspectives differ is in their motivational assumptions.
SDT and SJT acknowledge the existence of ingroup-favoring
motivations posited by SIT, but they tend to focus on other
motivations. SDT assumes a general human motivation (that
nonetheless varies between individuals and contexts) for
preferring hierarchical systems, that drives acceptance of
hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths and behaviors that
maintain hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). In the case of
SJT, it is a general motivation toward justifying social systems
that leads to the acceptance of beliefs that legitimize inequality,
including hostile responses toward minority groups (Jost et al.,
2004). When considering the present context, in which we are
hypothesizing about responses from a dominant group, the focal
motivations of these three perspectives tend to be aligned, as
the interests of dominant groups overlap to a large degree with
hierarchy maintenance and system justification. Thus, while we
based our predictions on SIT in particular, our predictions are
also derivable from SDT and SJT.

THE U.S. VS. PORTUGAL
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES

Currently, our knowledge of how anticipated demographic shifts
affect majority group members come from two diverse nations:
Canada and the U.S. For example, the U.S. is on the verge
of reaching a “tipping point”—or point where the racial/ethnic
majority will become a numerical minority by the middle of the
twenty-first century. White Americans now constitute roughly
62% of the U.S. population; a figure expected to decline to 44%
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In two experiments we examined how majority group members
in the U.S. (Study 1) and Portugal (Study 2) responded to real
future demographic shifts in which their ingroup’s relative size
is expected to decline markedly. Consistent with SIT (Tajfel
and Turner, 1979), we predicted that thinking of instability in
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informed consent electronically before beginning the study. The
experiment was approved by the Trinity College Institutional
Review Board.

the form of large declines in the relative size of the majority
population would lead to greater intergroup threat (Study 1
and 2), anger and fear toward minorities (Study 1) and a
willingness to engage in anti-immigration behaviors (Study 2).
Furthermore, we expected that negative reactions to future
demographic shifts would be moderated by perceptions of
legitimacy. Specifically, majority group members who perceive
their group’s status as legitimate would experience greater
intergroup threat and prejudiced responses toward minorities
after exposure to projections showing a large decrease in the
relative size of their majority group, compared with those who
perceive their ingroup’s status as relatively illegitimate.
In Study 1, White Americans were either presented with
real projections for 2060, in which they become a numerical
minority (43.6% of the population), or fake projections for
2060 that resembled figures from 2010 (Whites = 59% of
the population). In Study 2, ethnic Portuguese people were
either presented with real projections for 2060 in which (ethnic
Portuguese = 70% of the population), or fake projections that
resembled figures from 2010 (ethnic Portuguese = 90% of
the population). In both studies, we first measured the degree
to which majority group members perceived their status to
be legitimate. Then participants were exposed to one of two
projections for 2060 representing either a large decline condition
(i.e., real projections) or a small decline condition (i.e., fake
projections). Next, participants completed indicators of threat
and negative reactions toward minorities. For the experimental
manipulations used both studies see Supplementary Materials.

Materials and Procedure
All survey materials in Study 1 were written in English.
Participants completed a questionnaire that was created using
SurveyGizmo (2017). They were told that they were participating
in a study examining memory and recall. First, participants
provided consent and completed background questions about
their age, gender, legal status in the U.S., household income,
and education level. Embedded within the background questions
were two questions that assessed perceived legitimacy of status.
Next, participants were randomly assigned to either a large
decline condition (i.e., real projections) or a small decline (i.e.,
fake projections). In both conditions, participants were presented
with a newspaper article about racial demographic projections.
Both articles contained real racial demographic figures for 2010,
where White Americans comprised 63.7% of the population
and racial minorities comprised 36.3% (see Humes et al., 2011).
However, in the large decline condition a second figure showed
that Whites would account for 43.6% of the population in 2060,
whereas racial minorities would account for 56.4% (Colby and
Ortman, 2015). In the small decline condition, the additional
figure showed that Whites would account for 59% of the
population and racial minorities would account for 41%. We
encouraged participants to read the article closely, because they
would later complete a recall test based on the article’s contents.
In actuality, the recall test served as a manipulation check. Prior
to the recall test participants completed measures of intergroup
threat and anger and fear toward minorities. After completing
the dependent measures and the recall test, participants were fully
debriefed.

STUDY 1
In Study 1, we randomly assigned White American participants
to either a condition in which they were shown projections
illustrating a large decline in the relative size of the White
American population or projections showing a small decline in
the relative size of the White American population. We predicted
that White Americans exposed to real projections, in which their
relative share of U.S. population is expected to decline markedly,
would exhibit greater intergroup threat, and greater anger
and fear toward minorities. We expected individual differences
in perceived legitimacy to moderate the effect of condition
on intergroup threat and negative feelings toward minorities.
Specifically, compared to White Americans who perceive their
status to be relatively illegitimate, White Americans who perceive
their status as legitimate would experience heightened intergroup
threat and negative feelings toward minorities after exposure
to either set of projections. However, intergroup threat and
negative feelings toward minorities would be highest among
White Americans who perceive their status to be legitimate
and are exposed to projections showing a large decrease in the
proportion of the U.S. population that is White.

Measures
The measure of perceived legitimacy of status was adapted
from Weber et al. (2002), whereas the measures of intergroup
threat appraisals, anger and fear toward minorities and the
manipulation check were adapted from Outten et al. (2012).

Perceived legitimacy of status
Two items were averaged to create a perceived legitimacy index
(“It is quite justified that White Americans have higher status
in society than other racial groups in the U.S.” and “White
Americans deserve to have a better standing in society than other
racial groups in the U.S.”; r = 0.91). The scales ranged from 1
(strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicated
greater perceived legitimacy of status.

Intergroup threat appraisals
Appraisals of intergroup threat were measured using a 3-item
scale. The three items included: “My racial group should be
worried about its place in the future of the U.S.,” “My racial group
should be threatened by growing diversity” and “My racial group
will benefit from increasing diversity in the U.S.” α = 0.90. The
third item was reverse-coded. Response scales ranged from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicated
greater perceived threat to one’s ingroup from growing diversity.

Methods
Participants and Ethics Statement
Two-hundred White Americans (51% men, M age = 38.3 years,
SD = 10.59) were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk
(Buhrmester et al., 2011) and paid U.S. $3.50. In accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki all participants provided
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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Anger and fear toward minorities

generated do not contain zero, then one can conclude that the
conditional moderated effect is significant1 .
We found a significant interaction between perceived
legitimacy and demographic shift condition on intergroup
threat appraisals, R2 ch. = 0.026, F (1, 196) = 7.88, p < 0.001.
Examination of the conditional effects revealed that the effect
of condition on intergroup threat was significant for White
Americans who perceived their status as legitimate (+1 SD;
B = 1.01, SE = 0.29, 95% CI, [0.449, 1.579]). As shown in
Figure 1, participants who saw their status as highly legitimate
felt significantly more threatened by diversity in the large
decline condition, compared with those in the small decline
condition. Among White Americans who perceived their
status to be relatively illegitimate, condition had no effect on
intergroup threat appraisals; threat remained low across both
conditions (−1 SD; B = −0.12, SE = 0.28, 95% CI, [−0.683,
0.435]).
The proposed interaction between perceived legitimacy
and condition on anger toward minorities was statistically
significant, R2 ch. = 0.05, F (1, 196) = 16.50, p < 0.001.
Examination of the conditional effects revealed that the effect
of exposure to real projections on anger was significant for
White Americans who saw their status as legitimate (+1 SD;
B = 1.93, SE = 0.39, 95% CI, [1.162, 2.694]). As shown
in Figure 2, among White Americans who felt strongly that
their status was legitimate expressed significantly more anger
toward minorities after viewing projections indicating a large
decline in the relative size of White American population,
compared with when they viewed projections showing a small
decline in the White population. In contrast, for Whites
who perceived their status to be relatively illegitimate the
amount of anger they felt did not significantly differ across
demographic shift conditions (−1 SD; B = −0.30, SE =
0.38, 95% CI, [−1.061, 0.455]). Anger remained low in both
conditions.
Finally, we found a significant interaction between perceived
legitimacy and the demographic shift condition on fear toward
minorities, R2 ch. = 0.03, F (1, 196) = 6.98, p < 0.01. Inspection of
the conditional effects indicated that the effect of exposure to a
large decline in the White population on fear was significant. As
shown in Figure 3, White Americans who strongly legitimized
their current status reported significantly more fear after seeing
a large decline in the relative size of the White population,
compared to viewing a small decline in the relative size of the
White population (+1 SD; B = 1.50, SE = 0.38, 95% CI, [0.742,
2.260]). Conversely, among Whites who appraised their status
as relatively illegitimate, condition had no effect on fear toward
minorities; fear remained low across both conditions (−1 SD; B
= 0.06, SE = 0.38, 95% CI, [−0.689, 0.813]).

Participants were asked how they felt toward racial minorities
after reading the article. Specifically, they were asked about the
extent to which they felt anger (angry, annoyed, resentful; α
= 0.96) and fear (fearful, scared, frightened; α = 0.96) toward
minorities. The intergroup emotions scales were constructed by
averaging the scores of three individual items that comprised
each emotion. The response scales ranged from 1 (not at all) to
11 (extremely). Higher scores indicated feeling greater anger and
fear toward minorities.

Manipulation check
After completing statements assessing threat, anger and fear
participants were presented with an open-ended manipulation
check in which they were asked to recall the percentages that
Whites and racial minorities were expected to make-up in 2060.

Results
Frequency statistics for age, household income and education
level for White American (Study 1) and ethnic Portuguese (Study
2) samples are presented in Table 1. The means and standard
deviations for all focal variables in Study 1 and Study 2 are
presented in Table 2.

Manipulation Check
A one-way ANOVA showed that participants’ recall test
responses varied significantly by condition. Participants in the
large decline condition (M = 43.86) reported that Whites would
comprise a smaller share of the total population in 2060, relative
to those in the small decline condition (M = 57.17), F (1, 198) =
544.56, p < 0.001. Also participants in the large decline condition
reported that racial minorities would make up a significantly
greater share of the population in 2060 (M = 56.38), compared
with those in the small decline condition (M = 42.76), F (1, 198) =
521.78, p < 0.001.

Effect of Condition on Dependent Measures
Next, we tested whether the manipulation of demographic
information had different effects on intergroup threat, anger
and fear. Consistent with previous research (Outten et al., 2012)
participants in the large decline condition reported experiencing
greater intergroup threat, F (1, 198) = 4.32, p = 0.04; anger toward
minorities, F (1, 198) = 7.13, p < 0.01; and fear toward minorities,
F (1, 198) = 7.46, p < 0.01.

Perceived Legitimacy of Status as a Moderator
To examine whether perceived legitimacy of status moderated
the effect of demographic shift condition (coded: 1 = large
decline/real projections and 0 = small decline/fake projections)
on our dependent measures (intergroup threat, anger, and fear),
we ran three simple moderation models using Hayes’ (2013;
Model 1) PROCESS macro for SPSS. This allowed us to test if the
effect of condition on intergroup threat, anger and fear varied as
a function of perceived legitimacy of status, and provided us with
effects at different levels of perceived legitimacy (i.e., conditional
effects: ± 1 SD from the mean). If the 95% confidence intervals

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

1 We also ran each of the moderation models tested in Study 1 and Study 2 while
controlling for participant age and gender. The results were similar in that the
conditional moderated effect of perceived legitimacy of status was still statistically
significant even when controlling for age and gender. Specifically, the effects of
viewing a large decline in the relative size of one’s ingroup on each of the dependent
measures was significant for majority group members who perceived their status to
be highly legitimate, as evidenced by the 95% confidence intervals not containing
zero.
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TABLE 1 | Age, household income, and education frequency statistics for U.S. and Portuguese samples.
Study 1: U.S. sample (N = 200)

Study 2: Portugal sample (N = 92)

Age

Age

<20

0%

<20

10%

20–29

21%

20–29

89%

30–39

41%

30–39

1%

40–49

20%

40–49

0%

50–59

13%

50–59

0%

60+

6%

60+

0%

< $23,999

22%

< e458

35%

$24,000–44,999

26%

e458–833

22%

$45,000–69,999

24%

e834–1,167

14%

$70,000–99,999

18%

e1,168–2,083

17%

$100,000+

11%

e2,083–2,999

10%

e3,000+

2%

Household income (yearly, US dollars)

Household income (monthly, Euros)

Highest level of education

Highest level of education

Attended or completed high school

16%

Attending or completed high school

45%

Attend/ed or completed college or university

70%

Completed an undergraduate degree

45%

Attend/ed or completed graduate program

15%

Completed a postgraduate or Master’s degree

10%

Completed a doctorate

1%

Different categories for household income and level of education were used in the two studies. As such, they are not directly comparable. Household income in the U.S. is typically
measured in annual amounts, whereas household income in Portugal is typically measured in monthly amounts. The household income statistics presented in the table reflect those
differences. Due to rounding some category totals do not add up to 100%.

TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations for perceived legitimacy of status, and
dependent variables by demographic condition for Study 1 and Study 2.
Demographic shift condition
Small decline
Large decline
(fake projections) (real projections)
M

SD

M

SD

P

STUDY 1: U.S. SAMPLE
Perceived legitimacy of
status

4.17

2.43

4.36

2.58

0.61

Intergroup threat appraisal 2.86

1.47

3.37

1.90

0.04

Anger toward minorities

1.92

1.56

2.81

2.83

< 0.01

Fear toward minorities

1.86

1.46

2.71

2.63

< 0.01

1.94

4.90

2.37

0.83

STUDY 2: PORTUGAL SAMPLE
Perceived legitimacy of
status

4.80

Intergroup threat appraisal 2.95

0.86

4.27

1.53

< 0.001

Willingness to engage in
anti-immigrant behaviors

1.18

3.37

1.44

< 0.01

2.60

FIGURE 1 | The effect of demographic shift condition and perceived
legitimacy of status on intergroup threat appraisals (Study 1).

decline. These negative reactions in response to seeing a large
decline in the relative size of one’s dominant group were
greatest among those who perceived their status to be highly
legitimate. White Americans who perceived their status as
relatively illegitimate did not experience greater intergroup threat
and negative feelings toward minorities after viewing projections
showing a large decrease in the White population. While these
results support SITs (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; also Verkuyten and
Reijerse, 2008) contention that among majority group members

Discussion
Consistent with our predictions, White Americans who viewed
projections for 2060 showing a large decline in their racial group’s
relative size experienced heightened appraisals of intergroup
threat, as well as more anger and fear toward racial minorities,
compared to Whites who viewed projections showing a small

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

6

February 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 79

Outten et al.

Demographic Shifts and Perceived Legitimacy

perceptions of instability and legitimacy are determinants of
feeling threatened and reacting negatively toward minority
outgroups, it would be prudent to test whether these findings
generalize to other cultural contexts. Study 2 attempts to do that
by examining similar processes with an ethnic Portuguese sample
in Portugal.

group members respond to anticipated demographic changes
have tended to focus on attitudinal and emotional responses
(e.g., Outten et al., 2012; Craig and Richeson, 2014). In an
effort to broaden the outcomes examined, we assessed intentions
to engage in anti-immigrant behaviors (e.g., attending an antiimmigration protest, voting for anti-immigrant party). We were
also interested in assessing behavioral intentions related to
immigration because Portugal’s population more so than most
other nations is currently sustained by immigration. Portugal
has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world (Eurostat,
2017). In recent years, the Portuguese government has been
more vocal in encouraging immigration, largely due to low
fertility rates (Costa and Sousa, 2017). Second, Study 2 utilized
a slightly different manipulation of demographic projections.
Rather than presenting information broken down by racial
groups (i.e., Whites vs. racial minorities), the demographic
information presented to participants focused on ethnic heritage
(i.e., native Portuguese vs. foreigners and their descendants).
This is because unlike the U.S., the Portuguese government
does not breakdown population statistics by race, but rather
people’s countries of origin (e.g., Moreira, 2014; also see European
Commission, 2011). As such, it made sense that our projections
were consistent with how population projections are usually
depicted for Portugal.
Similar to Study 1, ethnic Portuguese participants were
randomly assigned to either a condition in which they
were shown real projections for 2060 where the proportion
of Portugal’s population that is ethnic Portuguese declines
significantly, or fake projections in which there is a small decline.
We predicted that those exposed to projections showing a large
decline in the relative size of the ethnic Portuguese population
would experience greater intergroup threat and a greater
willingness to engage in anti-immigrant behaviors. We expected
that ethnic Portuguese people who perceive their status as highly
legitimate would experience heightened intergroup threat and a
greater willingness to engage in anti-immigrant behaviors after
exposure to either set of demographic projections, compared
with ethnic Portuguese people who perceive their status to
be relatively illegitimate. Appraisals of intergroup threat and
anti-immigrant behavioral intentions would be highest among
ethnic Portuguese people who were exposed to demographic
projections showing a large decline in the relative size of the
ethnic Portuguese population and who perceive their status as
relatively legitimate.

STUDY 2

Methods

In Study 2, we assessed whether exposing ethnic Portuguese
people to real population projections showing a large decline in
their share of the total population, would lead them to express
greater intergroup threat and a stronger desire to engage in
behaviors aimed at limiting immigration to Portugal. We also
tested if these responses to impending demographic shifts would
be moderated by individual differences in perceived legitimacy of
status.
It is worth mentioning that Study 2 differed from Study 1
in some respects. First, prior studies examining how majority

Ninety-seven students from the University of Lisbon were
recruited via convenience sampling (38% women, M age =
22.6 years, SD = 6.26). Participants were recruited from
undergraduate and graduate classes. They were entered into a
draw to win 1 of 2 50e gift cards from a large national retailer.
The final sample consisted of 92 people; 5 participants who
did not self-identify as ethnic Portuguese and/or were not from
Portugal were excluded from the analysis. Participants’ consent
was obtained electronically prior to beginning the study in
accordance with Declaration of Helsinki. The Institute of Social

FIGURE 2 | The effect of demographic shift condition and perceived
legitimacy of status on anger toward minorities (Study 1).

FIGURE 3 | The effect of demographic shift condition and perceived
legitimacy of status on fear toward minorities (Study 1).
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in behaviors aimed at limiting immigration to Portugal (i.e., “I
would vote for a political party that wanted to limit immigration
until unemployment is reduced,” “I would volunteer time to
participate in a campaign aimed at getting the government to
reduce immigration rates,” “I would sign a petition demanding
that the government be more strict in the selection of
immigrants,” and “I would attend a demonstration to support
stricter immigration laws”; α = 0.85). Items were assessed using
a 7-point scales ranging from 1 (definitely no) to 7 (definitely
yes). Higher scores indicated greater anti-immigration behavioral
intentions.

Sciences at the University of Lisbon—the host institution for this
study—did not have an internal review board at the time the
study was conceived, but the study was approved by independent
scientific experts at the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia.

Materials and Procedure
The survey materials that were presented to participants in study
2 were written in the Portuguese. The materials were originally
composed in English by the first author. One of the primary
investigators and a research assistant, both of whom are bilingual
in Portuguese and English, then worked in tandem to ensure
accurate translation of the study materials to Portuguese.
The procedure was similar to Study 1. After completing
background questions containing a measure of perceived
legitimacy of status, participants were randomly assigned to read
one of two articles about demographic projections. Across both
conditions participants were informed that in 2010 the ethnic
Portuguese population was 92.6%, whereas the foreign-born
population was 7.4%. However, in the large decline condition
(i.e., real projections), participants were also informed that the
ethnic Portuguese population would be 70% of the population in
2060, whereas the foreign-born population and their descendants
were expected to comprise 30% of the population (European
Commission, 2011). For participants assigned to the small
decline condition (i.e., fake projections), participants were
informed that the ethnic Portuguese population would slightly
decrease to 90% in 2060, whereas the foreign-born population
and their descendants would increase to 10%. Afterwards
participants completed measures of intergroup threat appraisals
and anti-immigration behavioral intentions. Participants then
took a recall test that served as a manipulation check. Lastly, all
participants were fully debriefed.

Manipulation check
Similar to Study 1, participants completed an open-ended
manipulation check in which they were asked to recall the
projected percentages of ethnic Portuguese people, as well as, the
foreign-born population and their descendants in 2060.

Results
Manipulation Check
A one-way ANOVA showed that participants’ average recall
test answers differed significantly by condition. Participants in
the large decline condition (M = 70.18) reported that ethnic
Portuguese would comprise a smaller share of the population
in 2060, compared with those in the small decline condition (M
= 90.49), F (1, 90) = 746.68, p < 0.001. Furthermore, individuals
in the large decline condition reported that foreign-born people
and their descendants would make up a larger proportion of the
population in 2060 (M = 29.33), compared with those in the
small decline condition (M = 9.47), F (1, 90) = 563.29, p < 0.001.

Effect of Condition on Dependent Measures
Next, we tested whether the manipulation of demographic shifts
had different effects on appraisals of intergroup threat and antiimmigration behavioral intentions. Consistent with predictions
participants exposed to projections showing a large decline in
the relative size of the ethnic Portuguese population experienced
a greater appraisal of intergroup threat, F (1, 90) = 25.32, p <
0.001, and greater endorsement of anti-immigration behavioral
intentions, F (1, 90) = 7.61, p < 0.01.

Measures
Perceived legitimacy of status
The same perceived legitimacy items from Study 1 were used,
but were adapted to the Portuguese context (e.g., “It is quite
justified that native Portuguese have higher status in society
than foreigners” and “Native Portuguese deserve to have a better
standing in society than foreigners”; r = 0.94). Scales ranged from
1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicated
greater perceived legitimacy of status.

Perceived Legitimacy of Status as a Moderator
Similar to Study 1, we examined whether perceived legitimacy
of status moderated the effect condition (coded: 1 = large
decline/real projections and 0 = small decline/fake projections)
on intergroup threat appraisals and willingness to engage in
anti-immigration behaviors by using Hayes’ (2013; Model 1)
PROCESS macro for SPSS.
A significant interaction emerged between perceived
legitimacy of status and demographic shift condition on
intergroup threat appraisals, R2 ch. = 0.06, F (1, 88) = 18.26, p <
0.001. Inspection of the conditional effects showed that for both
ethnic Portuguese people who perceived their status as highly
legitimate, as well as ethnic Portuguese who saw their status as
relatively illegitimate, the effect of demographic condition on
the appraisal of intergroup threat was significant. As shown in
Figure 4, regardless of the degree to which ethnic Portuguese

Appraisals of intergroup threat
The same 3-item measure of intergroup threat appraisals used
in Study 1 was adapted to a Portuguese context. The items
included, “Portuguese people should be worried about their place
in the future of Portugal,” “The Portuguese should be threatened
by growing diversity” and “Portuguese people will benefit from
increasing diversity in Portugal;” α = 0.78. The third item was
reverse-scored. Scales ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Higher scores indicated greater perceived threat
to people of Portuguese descent from growing diversity.

Anti-immigration behavioral intentions
Four items were adapted from Tougas et al. (2006) openness
to toward immigration measure, to assess willingness to engage
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FIGURE 5 | The effect of demographic shift condition and perceived
legitimacy of status on anti-immigration behavioral intentions (Study 2).

FIGURE 4 | The effect of demographic shift condition and perceived
legitimacy of status on intergroup threat appraisals (Study 2).

illegitimate. Those who perceived their status to be highly
legitimate and were exposed to a large decline in relative size
of the ethnic Portuguese population were most threatened by
diversity and were most willing to engage in anti-immigration
behaviors. Taken together, the findings from Portugal suggest that
a nation might not need to reach a majority-minority “tipping
point” for majority group members to respond negatively to
demographic shifts. All it might take is a belief that one’s group
is deserving of their higher status.

people perceived their status as legitimate, viewing projections
that showed large decrease in the relative size of the ethnic
Portuguese population significantly heightened appraisals of
intergroup threat, compared with being exposed to projections
that indicated a small decline in relative size. However, the
effect of seeing a large decline in the relative size of the ethnic
Portuguese population on intergroup threat appraisals was
stronger among those who perceived their status as highly
legitimate (+1 SD; B = 2.01, SE = 0.23, 95% CI, [1.544, 2.475]),
compared with those who perceived their status to be illegitimate
(−1 SD; B = 0.57, SE = 0.23, 95% CI, [0.109, 1.034]).
The proposed interaction between perceived legitimacy of
status and condition on anti-immigration behavioral intentions
was significant, R2 ch. = 0.04, F (1, 88) = 6.52, p = 0.01.
Examination of the conditional effects showed that the effect of
viewing a large decline in the relative size of the ethnic Portuguese
population on the anti-immigration behavioral intentions was
significant for ethnic Portuguese people who perceived their
status to be highly legitimate (+1 SD; B = 1.32, SE = 0.32, 95%
CI, [0.684, 1.953]). As shown in Figure 5, for ethnic Portuguese
people who viewed their status as highly legitimate, seeing a large
decrease in the proportion of Portugal’s population that is ethnic
Portuguese population led to significantly greater willingness to
engage in anti-immigration behaviors, compared with viewing
a small decrease. Conversely, among ethnic Portuguese people
who perceived their status as relatively illegitimate, there was no
effect of condition on intention to engage in anti-immigration
behaviors; intention to engage in anti-immigration behaviors was
low across both conditions (−1 SD; B = 0.15, SE = 0.32, 95% CI,
[–0.482, 0.778]).

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Studies in North America have found that racial/ethnic majority
group members tend to have negative psychological reactions
to thinking about growing diversity in the future because it
can signal a decline in status (e.g., Outten et al., 2012). We
conducted studies in the U.S. and Portugal, and found evidence
that perceiving sizeable future declines in the relative size of one’s
ingroup predicted heightened intergroup threat (Study 1 and 2),
anger and fear toward minorities (Study 1) and also a greater
willingness to engage in behaviors aimed at limiting immigration
(Study 2). In accordance with SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), the
degree to which majority group members responded negatively to
large future declines in relative size their racial/ethnic group was
contingent on the degree to which they perceived their higherstatus as legitimate. Specifically, the more that people believed
their ingroup’s higher-status was deserved, the more threatened
they were by diversity and the more negatively they reacted
toward minority outgroups after exposure to real projections
showing a sizeable decline in the relative size of their racial/ethnic
majority group.
The two studies reported here help to shed light on the
psychological and contextual boundary conditions of thinking
about future demographic changes. First, not all majority group
members appear to be threatened by future demographic shifts,
rather those who can recognize that their relative status as
illegitimate do not seem as threatened by a more diverse future.

Discussion
The results from this study largely replicated those from the
U.S. Regardless of condition, ethnic Portuguese people who
appraised their status as highly legitimate expressed greater threat
and reported being more willing to engage in anti-immigration
behaviors compared to people who saw their status as relatively
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perceived legitimacy of status, thus making it difficult to make
causal claims about perceived legitimacy of status determining
reactions to anticipated demographic changes. For future studies,
it would be wise to manipulate perceived legitimacy of status
to confirm the moderating role of perceived legitimacy on
psychological responses to future demographic shifts. Second,
our independent and dependent variables were fairly obtrusive.
As such, demand characteristics like social desirability might have
influenced participants’ responses. For example, responding to
questions about how threatening demographic changes are for
one’s ingroup after being exposed to the respective experimental
manipulations, might have led some participants to report being
less threatened in an effort to appear less prejudiced. A desire to
appear less prejudiced among some participants in both studies
might explain why mean scores on our dependent measures
fell below the midpoint (see Table 2). Past studies assessing the
psychological effects of exposure to future demographic changes
have also found that participants tend to score below the mean
on measures of perceived threat and intergroup emotions (e.g.,
Outten et al., 2012; Danbold and Huo, 2015). To limit socially
desirable responding, we employed deception by informing our
participants that we were examining how the presentation of
information affects recall ability and administering a recall test.
This method of deception has been used in prior studies to
limit the influence of demand characteristics (e.g., Outten et al.,
2012). Future studies examining these issues might also consider
directly assessing the influence of demand characteristics on
participants’ responses (see Rubin, 2016). A third limitation of
the current research concerns the fact that our studies were not
equivalent in some respects. Specifically, compared to the U.S.
sample, the Portuguese sample was smaller, predominately male,
and primarily comprised of people in their 20’s. Thus, it might be
reasonable to assume that the U.S. sample is more comparable
to White American population, than the Portuguese is sample
is comparable to the ethnic Portuguese population. The reason
that the Portuguese sample was smaller and less varied in terms
of its demographic profile was because Portuguese participants
were recruited via convenience sampling on a university campus.
Many of the Portuguese participants were recruited from
business courses. Consequently, any generalization beyond the
parameters of our study’s samples must be done with a degree
of caution. Some caution is also warranted with respect to the
interpretation of our findings, because the dependent measures
in both studies differed. While intergroup threat was measured in
both studies, Study 1 also assessed negative intergroup emotions
and Study 2 measured anti-immigration behavioral intentions.
All of these variables constitute negative psychological reactions,
but they are not identical psychological constructs. Future crosscultural studies examining psychological reactions to future
demographic changes should try to procure samples that are
comparable in most respects and measure similar constructs
across cultures. Taking these steps would likely strengthen the
external validity of future cross-cultural investigations.
Another avenue for future study would be to further explore
the cultural boundary conditions of the processes examined here.
Thus far, all research in this area has been conducted in countries
that currently have a White racial majority, or in the case of

This is consistent with prior studies, in that illegitimate ingroup
advantages can lead members of high-status groups to feel
collective guilt (Miron et al., 2006) and feelings of collective guilt
can elicit favorable evaluations of relevant lower-status outgroups
(Doosje et al., 1998). Regardless of condition, it was majority
group members who perceived their status as legitimate who were
most threatened by diversity and who reacted most negatively
toward outgroups; which is consistent with the notion that
perceived legitimacy makes majority group members more prone
to protecting their status. However, legitimacy coupled with
perceived instability—in the form of exposure to demographic
projections showing a large decline in the relative size of the
racial/ethnic majority population—seemed to engender the most
negative responses across both cultural contexts. A finding
consistent with SITs tenet that a status structure perceived as
legitimate and unstable is particularly threatening for dominant
groups in society (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
Secondly, by finding a relatively similar pattern of results
in Portugal we were able to demonstrate that majority group
members seem to react more negatively to future demographic
shifts regardless of whether or not one’s group is projected to
be a numerical minority in the future. This is an important
finding given that Portugal is a country that differs from the
U.S. on a number of cultural dimensions (Basabe and Ros, 2005;
Yeganeh and May, 2011). Portugal is also a cultural context
where the “tipping point”—the time when the numerical majority
is expected to become a numerical minority—is much farther
off. Interestingly, the percentage decrease in the relative size
of the racial/ethnic majority between 2010 figures and the real
projections for 2060 were nearly identical between the two studies
(i.e., a 20% decrease in Portugal, from 90 to 70%; a 20.1% decrease
in the United States, from 63.7 to 43.6%). Thus, it might be the
case that thinking about any substantial decline in the relative size
of one’s ingroup can pose a threat to a majority group member’s
social identity.
Thirdly, it is worth noting that while greater perceived
legitimacy of status was associated with increased concern over
a more diverse future across both cultural contexts, this effect
did appear to be stronger among the Portuguese sample (see
Figure 4). Perceived legitimacy scores were also slightly higher
in the Portuguese sample (see Table 2). It does make some
sense, that in an older country like Portugal, where the majority
group has a far greater claim to being indigenous to their
nation, that ethnic Portuguese people would be more inclined to
perceive their higher-status as legitimate. As such, perceptions of
legitimacy of status might depend on the broader sociohistorical
context and social representations of a nation’s immigration
history. Hence, within different countries individual ideologies
should be considered in conjunction with analyses of the broader
sociohistorical context.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although the findings from the two studies reported here
are valuable, we acknowledge that there are some limitations
with this research. First, we measured rather than manipulated
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Portugal, a White majority ethnic group. It is important to know
whether our findings would generalize to other cultural contexts.
For example, countries where Whites are higher-status, but are
currently a numerical minority that is expected to decline in the
coming decades (e.g., South Africa), or in countries where a highstatus non-White population is declining in relative size, like
the United Arab Emirates (Corcoran, 2012; Malit and Al Youha,
2013).
Our findings are consistent with SIT’s assumption that
ingroup-favoring motivations lead members of high-status
groups to act in ways that protect their high-status, assuming they
see that higher status as legitimate. However, system justification
theory might explain the same effects as reflecting a motivation to
protect a social system that is perceived to be legitimate. Similarly,
SDT might explain the effects as resulting from a motivation to
maintain a hierarchy per se, rather than attempts to protect the
ingroup’s place within that hierarchy. Although these motivations
are aligned when considering the perspective of dominant
groups, they tend to be in conflict for members of subordinate
groups. Therefore, one route for future research would be to
examine how members of racial/ethnic minority groups respond
to anticipated demographic changes, an area yet to be fully
explored (for an exception see Craig and Richeson, 2017). From
a SIT perspective (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), members of lowstatus groups might respond positively to increasing diversity if
they perceive it as an opportunity to elevate the status of their
illegitimately disadvantaged group. If low-status groups tend to
perceive their lower-status as legitimate, they might not respond
so positively to increasing diversity. Social dominance theory,
and system justification theory, however, both point toward the
possibility that members of low-status groups might actually
respond to increasing diversity with hostility toward minorities,
if they see that diversity as threatening a legitimate hierarchy or a
just social system (Levin et al., 2002). Beyond these theoretical
considerations, however, it seems important for applied and
political reasons to include members of low-status groups in
research on demographic change.

psychological and cultural boundary conditions of reactions to
these demographic shifts could be crucial to managing diversity
in increasingly multicultural societies.
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CONCLUSION
The findings of the two studies suggest that beliefs about the
security of the status hierarchy might influence how majority
group members react to future demographic shifts. For those
who perceive their group’s current higher-status as legitimate,
exposure to information about future demographic shifts seems
to engender reactance in the form of being threatened by diversity
and negative reactions toward minorities. Whereas individuals
who can recognize that their higher-status is illegitimate to
some degree are less threatened by the prospect of a more
diverse future. This was true of both White Americans and
ethnic Portuguese in Portugal, suggesting that the psychological
underpinnings of negative reactions to greater diversity might
be similar to some degree across cultural contexts. As nations
become more ethnically/racially diverse, understanding the
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